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INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt about the extent of Chancellor Allen's
judicial reputation, both among legal scholars and practicing attorneys.
Toward the end of Chancellor Allen's judicial career, Professor
Michael Dooley offered the following assessment: "He is widely
regarded by the bar and academics as the leading judicial expert on
corporate and business law cases."' Professor James Cox, who claims
that he often disagrees with Chancellor Allen, was more effusive:
"He's really an extraordinary judge. He brings the acuity of years of
practice as well as a very outstanding academic bent-which is
something characteristic of the very best judges in American jurispru-
dence."2  Practitioners Dennis Block, Stephen Radin, and Michael
Maimone gave the following tribute: "Many lawyers, academics, and
jurists have 'struggle[d] to fashion answers' to the myriad of business
judgment rule questions raised during the 'deal decade' of the 1980s
and the new issues that have arisen in the 1990s, but none has
surpassed the intellectual ability and skill consistently demonstrated by
Chancellor William T. Allen. . .. " Commentators engage in
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1. Stephen Keating, Chancery Court: Unique, 'Schizoid', DENV. POST, Mar. 15, 1996, at
C1 (quoting Professor Dooley).
2. Joyce M. Rosenberg, Judge in Time-Paramount Fight: Highly Regarded but Hard to
Predict, ASsOc. PRESS, July 9, 1989, at 1, available in 1989 WL 4045619.
3. Dennis J. Block et al., Chancellor Allen, The Business Judgment Rule, and the Shareholders'
Right to Decide, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 785, 785 (1992).
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occasional sniping against particular Allen decisions,4 but the general
estimation of his abilities is overwhelmingly positive.'
Although judicial reputations are inevitably contingent,6 there is
a wide gulf between "celebrity" and greatness. Judge Ito is a celebrity;
Chancellor Allen was a great judge. But Chancellor Allen's substantial
reputation is anomalous. Large judicial reputations are usually made
by Supreme Court justices or an occasional federal appellate court
judge, like Learned Hand or Henry Friendly. After all, these judges
are in a position to craft enduring change.7 As Margaret Sachs notes,
"Transient changes-such as those quickly trumped by Congress or
the Supreme Court-are apt soon to be forgotten, along with the
judges who brought them about. Enduring changes-and the judges
who brought them about-are likely to be remembered."'  Unlike
most renowned judges, Chancellor Allen was a state trial court judge!
Of course, the Delaware Court of Chancery is not a typical state
trial court. Stephen Massey noted that Chancellor Allen's reputation
is partially attributable to the fact that "he has presided over the
Delaware Court of Chancery, the nation's central forum for shaping
American corporate law, during a period of intense corporate activ-
ity."9  Especially during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when
Chancellor Allen was deciding cases, the Delaware Court of Chancery
was the center of the corporate law universe. Allen was Chancellor
and could assign the most important cases to himself.10 Lynn Stout
has likened the position of Chancellor to the position of Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court."
4. See, e.g., John Riley, The Good, Bad and Ugly: A Few Arbitrary Awards, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 26, 1989, at 2 (giving Allen the "Corporate Stalinism" award for his opinion in Paramount
Communications Inc., v. Time Inc., CIV. A. Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935, 1989 WL 79880 (Del.
Ch. Jul. 14, 1989), which Riley called "the legal equivalent of Manuel Noriega for the notion of
corporate democracy");
5. For other statements about Chancellor Allen's status as a judge, see, e.g., Stephen J.
Massey, Chancellor Allen's Jurisprudence and the Theory of Corporate Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L.
683, 684 (1992) ("Chancellor William T. Allen ... is one of the most significant contemporary
jurists.").
6. Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The Creation of
a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777, 779 (1997). But see RICHARD A. POSNER,
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 63-64 (1990).
7. Sachs, supra note 6, at 783-84.
8. Id. at 783-84 (citations omitted).
9. Massey, supra note 5, at 686.
10. The Delaware Court of Chancery is comprised of five judges: one Chancellor and four
Vice Chancellors. The Chancellor is the "chief judge" of the court and handles numerous
administrative functions for the court, including the assignment of cases.
11. Firms Watch Change at Top of Del. Court, BALT. SUN, Mar. 3, 1997, at 1OC (quoting
Professor Stout).
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Business developments during the 1980s required guidance from
the nation's guardians of corporate law-the Delaware judiciary-and
Chancellor Allen was there to provide it. Richard Posner has
observed, "Given two . . . judges . . . of equal quality, one may be
more influential than another simply because he is working at a time
... [when] standards ... are more fluid than at other times. ... "2
This insight actually increases the puzzle of Chancellor Allen's
reputation, because he was not a great innovator. 3 Few of his cases
appear in law school casebooks,' 4 and some his most-cited opinions
were in cases where the Delaware Supreme Court had the last word. 5
Chancellor Allen's conservative inclinations might have dampened his
chances for judicial fame because, as Margaret Sachs argues: "In
general, activist judges have greater opportunities for renown than do
judges who curtail past excesses. The activist receives credit for the
doctrines she creates, whereas the curtailer at most shares credit with
the authors of the doctrines he pares back."' 6
So why is Chancellor Allen considered to have been a great judge?
Any effort to explain judicial reputation inevitably treads on soggy
12. POSNER, supra note 6, at 71.
13. As with most generalizatons, this one has exceptions. See, e.g., In re Caremark
International Inc. Derivative Litigation, CIV. A. No.. 13670, 1996 WL 549894, at *11 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 25, 1996) (finding within the duty of care "a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that
a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists");
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., CIV. A. No. 12, 150,
1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (concluding that "where a corporation is
operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue
risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.").
14. A survey of three major casebooks reveals very little use of Chancellor Allen's opinions.
See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 1994) (referring to decisions in Cinerama, Inc.
v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 1994) and Paramount Communications
Inc. v. Time Inc., CIV. A. Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935, 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. Jul. 14, 1989)
(in the notes); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (4th ed.
1995) (including excerpts from five cases: Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. Jun. 17,
1994); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., CIV. A. No.
12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time
Inc., CIV. A. Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935, 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. Jul. 14, 1989); AC Acquisi-
tions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 1986); and Lacos
Land Group v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. Jul. 31, 1986)); WILLIAM L. CARY
& MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 1995)
(including an excerpt from Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch. Oct.
12, 1994), and a note on Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. Jul. 25,
1988).
15. See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. 1994); Paramount
Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
16. Sachs, supra note 6, at 783.
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 21:577
ground. Attempts to quantify judicial reputation are often silly, 7 and
comparisons among judges are usually biased by personal or political
motivations."8 Even if everyone agreed with Stephen Massey that
"Allen's significance is more than a question of a judge who was in the
right place at the right time,' 9 the task of explaining that significance
would remain.
In this Article, I attempt to explain Chancellor Allen's expansive
reputation by examining his ability to speak to what philosopher John
Danley calls "the fundamental question": "What is the appropriate
role of the modem corporation in a free society?"2  From the
chartering of the first corporations in the United States to the present
day, debate over the fundamental question has been rancorous. On
one side of the debate stand those who believe that society is best
served when corporations strive to maximize profits for the benefit of
shareholders; on the other side stand those who believe that corpora-
tions should have some more explicit public purpose.
17. James Gordon mocks Judge Richard Posner's attempt to "reduce (Cardozo's]
achievements to a set of numbers on a baseball card" and argues that any attempt to understand
judicial reputation in quantitative terms is an "effort to quantify the unquantifiable." James D.
Gordon, III, Cardozo's Baseball Card, 44 STAN. L. REV. 899, 900, 902 (1992). Surveys may offer
a more useful method of measuring judicial reputation, see, e.g., WILLIAM D. PEDERSON AND
NORMAN W. PROVIZER, GREAT JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: RATINGS AND
CASES (1993), but these are also problematic. See William G. Ross, The Ratings Game: Factors
That Influence Judicial Reputation, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 402 (1996) (stating that ratings of
Supreme Court justices "may sometimes seem like a parlor game").
18. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology
and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 576, 578 (1995) ("The further I probed into the
process by which Holmes and Brandeis were canonized, the more I became convinced that the
investment their acolytes made in them transcended their status as judges.").
19. Massey, supra note 5, at 687. Massey elaborates on his statement as follows: In many
important areas of corporate law-the rights of bondholders, the rise of institutional investors, the
scope of a corporation's "constituencies"-Allen's opinions have responded to significant
developments in corporate law and practice and have themselves established an agenda of
corporate issues for the 1990s. Id. Massey contends, therefore, that Allen's reputation is justified
by his ability to set the agenda for the development of corporate law and to do so in a way that
"has contributed to the revival of interest in the study of corporate law as an intellectual
endeavor." Id. at 687-88. Massey proceeds to study Allen's jurisprudence and concludes that
it reflects two underlying themes: certainty (the ability of corporate planners to predict how the
courts will analyze their transactions) and legitimacy (justification for allowing directors to exert
power). Id. at 688.
20. JOHN R. DANLEY, THE ROLE OF THE MODERN CORPORATION IN A FREE SOCIETY
2 (1994). William Ross identifies "Impact on Legal Development: The Vision Factor" as "the
most fair and rational factor-and perhaps the most important element-that influences judicial
reputation." Ross, supra note 16, at 404. Other factors identified by Ross include longevity of
tenure (the "Geriatric Factor"), intellectual ability (the "Egghead Factor"), precourt and postcourt
careers (the "Celebrity Factor"), and proximity in time (the "Myopia Factor").
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Chancellor Allen's approach to the fundamental question-and his
most important legacy to corporate law-was to embrace traditional
corporate norms, not to create new norms, during an era of great
upheaval and innovation in business practices. According to Chancel-
lor Allen, determining the appropriate role of the modem corporation
in a free society requires judicial intervention only on rare occasions.
In most instances, directors and shareholders, operating within the
constraints imposed by corporations statutes and other regulations (e.g.,
environmental law, labor and employment laws, antitrust laws, etc.),
are best left alone.
But does this qualify Chancellor Allen as a great judge? Certainly
his skill at explaining the application of traditional norms to new
situations marks him as a judicial craftsman of high intellect.
Nevertheless, I believe that his courage in facing down a Supreme
Court intent of creating its own legacy2 '-all the while under strict
public scrutiny 22---is a mark of greatness. Admittedly, his approach
was somewhat unoriginal (relying, as it did, on traditional standards),
and it might be argued that it evaded the fundamental question
because it was essentially procedural, not substantive. But Chancellor
Allen understood that process often determines substance; the person
who makes decisions often determines what the decisions will be. He
also understood that society has a huge stake in the resolution of the
fundamental question. In the words of Ron Gilson, "[a]s a matter of
corporate law, the challenge was to apportion decision responsibilities
among directors, shareholders, and courts. As a matter of social
policy, the outcome would determine who governed the largest and
most powerful private institutions in our society.P23
21. Ronald Gilson makes a similar point, arguing that Allen's skill as a judge is evidenced
by his ability to keep "the Supreme Court at bay so that a coherent body of law could be
developed and maintained." Ronald J. Gilson, The Fine Art of Judging: William T. Allen, 2 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 914-16 (1997).
22. It is useful to remember that at the time Chancellor Allen took the bench in 1985 (and
even today, to some extent), the Delaware courts were viewed as suspiciously promanagement by
many scholars and in the popular press. See, e.g., Deal Reached in Revlon Case, SEATrLE TIMES,
Dec. 3, 1985, at F10. Chancellor Allen's defense of traditional corporate norms, therefore, was
not a strategic ploy designed to win him widespread praise.
23. Gilson, supra note 21, at 914-15. John R. Danley identified two normative "ideologies"
relating to the fundamental question. The first ideology, which he calls the "Classical" view,
holds that "the primary responsibility of corporations is to compete economically in the context
of a limited government. For many, if not most, this means that the primary responsibility is to
increase profits for stockholders; true believers would claim that the sole responsibility is to
maximize profit for stockholders." DANLEY, supra note 20, at 3. The second is the "Managerial"
ideology, which holds that "corporations have responsibilities to a wide variety of 'stakeholders'
(employees, suppliers, distributors, competitors, consumers, local communities, governmental
agencies, etc.) whose interests must be weighed in making a decision." DANLEY, supra note 20,
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Nowhere in corporate law is the fundamental question more
conspicuous or more relevant than in takeover cases implicating the
shareholder primacy norm.24  When a board of directors has elected
to sell control of a corporation, Delaware courts evaluate the behavior
of the directors pursuant to standards announced in Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (Revlon).25 When it applies,
Revlon requires the directors to obtain "the highest price for the benefit
of the stockholders." 26
Chancellor Allen began his judicial tenure shortly before the
Delaware Supreme Court decided Revlon, and Allen's first opinion
citing Revlon appeared less than one month after the Delaware
Supreme Court's opinion was issued.27 Allen's final Revlon opinion
was written shortly before he left the bench.28 In the 11 years
between his first and last opinions dealing with Revlon, Chancellor
Allen had both the opportunity and the inclination to speak often and
forcefully on the fundamental question.29
The following sections analyze Allen's decisions involving Revlon
duties and reveal his role in shaping those duties. Part one briefly
describes the major cases decided by the Delaware Supreme Court
defining the contours of "Revlon duties." Part two describes Chancel-
lor Allen's Revlon jurisprudence. Finally, Part three concludes with
my view of Chancellor Allen's legacy to corporate law. I argue that
Chancellor Allen successfully defended the traditional allocation of
power over corporate decisionmaking among directors, shareholders,
and courts by artfully and insistently rebuffing attempts of the
Delaware Supreme Court to expand the role of the courts into areas
where they have no useful role. In so doing, Chancellor Allen helped
at 3. Danley's Classical and Managerial positions correspond roughly to descriptions of"contractarian" and "communitarian" views of corporate law. David Millon, Communitarians,
Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1377-78 (1993).
24. For an extended examination of the shareholder primacy norm in the context of ordinary
business decisions, see D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L.
(forthcoming 1997).
25. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
26. Id. at 182.
27. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 1986).
28. Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, CIV. A. No. 15513,1997 WL 225708, at *1
(Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1997).
29. As of the date of Chancellor Allen's departure from the bench, the Delaware courts had
cited Revlon in 142 decisions. Of those decisions, 19 were by the Delaware Supreme Court, 1 by
the Delaware Superior Court, and 122 by the Delaware Court of Chancery. The following was
the distribution among judges on the Court of Chancery: Jacobs (35), Allen (33), Hartnett (22),
Chandler (18), Berger (12), Steele (1), Duffy (retired Delaware Supreme Court justice sitting by
designation) (1).
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to ensure that the appropriate role of the modern corporation in a free
society would be decided by individual actors in that society rather
than by judicial fiat.
REVLON AND ITS PROGENY IN THE DELAWARE
SUPREME COURT
Revlon was decided by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985,30
along with some of the most enduring cases in the history of Delaware
corporate law. Perhaps the most significant case decided that year was
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. (Unocal),"1 in which the court
held that directors have an "enhanced duty" when they take defensive
action to thwart a takeover.32 It is a misnomer to suggest that the
duties of directors are enhanced under Unocal; what is enhanced is the
level of scrutiny applied by the reviewing court. The Unocal decision
entitled the court to inquire not only into whether the directors "had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed because of another person's stock ownership," but
also whether any defensive action taken by the board was "reasonable
in relation to the threat posed."33  The first prong of the Unocal
standard was old hat,34 but the second prong allowed a substantive
investigation into director action that was unprecedented absent
evidence of some identified conflict of interest.3 The rationale for
this enhanced scrutiny was not based upon a single conflict to be found
under particular circumstances. Rather, the rational centered on the"omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders."3 6
Decided after Unocal, Revlon applied enhanced scrutiny to
defensive actions taken by the directors of Revlon, Inc. (Revlon) to
30. Although the written decision was not issued until 1986, the Delaware Supreme Court
issued an oral decision on Nov. 1, 1985.
31. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). In addition to Revlon, other major cases decided in 1985
were Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) and Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
32. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 954.
33. Id. at 949.
34. The first prong is based on Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964), which is
satisfied "by showing good faith and reasonable investigation." IcL at 555. Although directors
bear the burden of proof, this standard is highly deferential to directors in the spirit of the
business judgment rule. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate
Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247,
249 (1989).
35. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955.
36. Id. at 954.
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fend off advances made by Pantry Pride, Inc. (Pantry Pride)37 But
the reason the Revlon decision is important lies in the court's explana-
tion of the board's duty once a company is "for sale":
The Revlon board's authorization permitting management to
negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition
that the company was for sale. The duty of the board had thus
changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders'
benefit. This significantly altered the board's responsibilities under
the Unocal standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate policy
and effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly
inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive measures became
moot. The directors' role changed from defenders of the corporate
bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company.3"
Applying this standard to the facts at hand, the court could not
seem to decide whether the directors of Revlon, Inc. (Revlon) breached
a duty of loyalty or a duty of care. The focus of the court's consterna-
tion was that fact that the board of directors of Revlon had favored
Forstmann39 over Pantry Pride because Forstmann was willing to
support the market price of notes previously issued by Revlon to
repurchase shares of stock, in an early attempt to ward off Pantry
Pride. The court found that this concern for noteholders was
inappropriate because their rights "already were fixed by contract. '40
As a result, "when the Revlon board entered into an auction-ending
lock-up agreement with Forstmann on the basis of impermissible
considerations at the expense of the shareholders, the directors
breached their primary duty of loyalty."41 A bit later in the opinion,
but still in the same section, the court observed, "[t]he principal object
[of the lock-up agreement with Forstmann], contrary to the board's
duty of care, appears to have been protection of the noteholders over
the shareholders' interests.1 42
The inability of the Delaware Supreme Court to distinguish
between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty may seem like so
much academic nit-picking, but I believe that it is the source of many
37. Revlon Inc., 506 A.2d at 180.
38. Id. at 182.
39. Forstmann was a named defendant who acted in conjunction with Revlon to block
efforts by Pantry Pride to acquire Revlon. Id. at 175.
40. Id. at 182.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 184.
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of the subsequent problems with the Revlon decision. When claims
implicate the duty of care, courts are generally deferential, largely
limiting their examination to process issues using the business
judgment rule as the standard. On the other hand, when claims
implicate the duty of loyalty, courts abandon the business judgment
rule and engage in a more searching, substantive review. The
Delaware Supreme Court's failure to decide whether Revlon claims
implicate the duty of care or the duty of loyalty was a failure to decide
the proper role of the courts.
The opinion in Revlon is impenetrable. Beyond the confusion
over the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, there is considerable
ambiguity over the relationship between Revlon and Unocal.43
Although the Court alludes to Unocal in the portion of the opinion
discussed above-concluding that "the merger agreement with
Forstmann was unreasonable in relation to the threat posed" 4 4-it
appeared to create a new standard distinct from Unocal to be applied
in the context of a sale of the company.4" This ambiguity in turn
generated two questions that plague the Delaware court to this day.
First, when do the standards embodied in Revlon apply?4 6  Second,
what new duties, if any, does Revlon impose?
The Delaware Supreme Court made its first effort to interpret the
Revlon duties in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp. (Ivan-
hoe).47  However, the court's determination of Revlon's scope in that
case has been characterized as "cryptic reasoning.- 4' Ivanhoe involved
43. This issue is addressed in some detail below. See infra Part III.
44. Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 182.
45. Although the court refers to the responsibilities of the board as being "under the Unocal
standards," it states that the "duty of the board has ... changed." Id. at 182. Elsewhere, the
court notes that fending off a hostile bidder-although sometimes appropriate under Unocal-is
"no longer a proper objective" once the company is for sale. Id.
46. Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman describe the difficulty with this question:
Revlon ties management's obligations during a takeover event to a discrete event-the
point at which the sale of the company becomes inevitable-that is both ambiguous and
commonplace, since its occurrence may be difficult to pinpoint in a hostile takeover, and
yet it must arise in every friendly acquisition. Within the confines of defending against
a hostile takeover, Revlon poses the problem of specifying precisely what action or
decision finally trips the board's duty to lay down its arms and discharge "the Revlon
obligation to conduct a sale." [Citing Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535
A.2d 1334, 1338 (Del. 1987).] Outside the setting of a hostile takeover, Revlon raises
the open-ended issue of what follows when the identical action or decision occurs in the
course of a friendly deal that does not respond to a hostile bid.
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37,
38 (1990).
47. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
48. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 46, at 42.
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a defensive recapitalization that transferred effective control over the
target corporation to management.49 The court concluded that Revlon
did not apply because the recapitalization was not a "sale" and did not
result in a "bidding contest," even though there was a change of
control.
This narrow reading of Revlon did not survive the Delaware
Supreme Court's first major pass at Revlon in Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc. (Macmillan)" Justice Moore, the author of both the
Unocal and Revlon opinions, also wrote the court's opinion in the
Macmillan case. He summarized the requirements of Revlon duties in
general terms:
At a minimum, Revlon requires that there be the most scrupulous
adherence to ordinary principles of fairness in the sense that
stockholder interests are enhanced, rather than diminished, in the
conduct of an auction for the sale of corporate control .... The
sole responsibility of the directors in such a sale is for the share-
holder's benefit. The board may not allow any impermissible
influence inconsistent with the best interests of the shareholders, to
alter the strict fulfillment of these duties."'
Later in the opinion, the court provided a more succinct statement
of Revlon duties: "[I]n a sale of corporate control the responsibility of
the directors is to get the highest value reasonably attainable for the
shareholders. Beyond that, there are no special and distinct 'Revlon
duties."' 52 In Macmillan the court's emphasis on the "best interests
of the stockholders" and on the "highest value reasonably attainable"
suggests a subtle shift away from the "best price" or sale "to the
highest bidder" that was required by Revlon.53 Indeed, the court in
Macmillan defined the board's Revlon duties as follows: "The proper
objective. of Macmillan's fiduciaries was to obtain the highest price
reasonably available for the company, provided it was offered by a
reputable and responsible bidder." 4 The proviso appears to qualify the
board's duties in a manner not contemplated in Revlon. Indeed, the
Macmillan court listed many factors that a board might consider in
determining whether the bidder is reputable and responsible, including
49. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1334.
50. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
51. Id. at 1285.
52. Id. at 1288 (citations omitted).
53. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc., 559 A.2d at 1285, 1264; Revlon, Inc., 506
A.2d at 182.
54. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc., 559 A.2d at 1282 (emphasis added) (citing
Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 182, 184).
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not only the adequacy and terms of the offer, but also "the impact of
both the bid and the potential acquisition on other constituencies,
provided that it bears some reasonable relationship to general share-
holder interests," and "the bidders identity, prior background, and
other business venture experiences." 5 The court did not explain why
any of these things matter.
The court also linked Revlon duties to the enhanced scrutiny
standard of Unocal:
As we held in Revlon, when management of a target company
determines that the company is for sale, the board's responsibilities
under the enhanced Unocal standards are significantly altered.
Although the board's responsibilities under Unocal are far different,
the enhanced duties of the directors in responding to a potential
shift in control, recognized in Unocal, remain unchanged. The
principle pervades Revlon, and when directors conclude that an
auction is appropriate, the standard by which their ensuing actions
will be judged continues to be the enhanced standard imposed by
this Court in Unocal.5 6
This general statement of the nexus between Unocal and Revlon,
which at first blush seems almost plausible, is incoherent in applica-
tion. The two-pronged test in Unocal contemplates an outside threat
to shareholder interests and a defensive action by the board of directors
in response to that threat. In cases implicating Revlon, on the other
hand, "[t]he whole question of defensive measures became moot."57
The court attempts to gloss over this conceptual problem by claiming
that Revlon involves the application of "enhanced scrutiny," even if the
two-pronged test, "of necessity, is slightly different."5" Revlon's
version of enhanced scrutiny proceeds as follows:
At the outset, the plaintiff must show and the trial court must find,
that the directors of the target company treated one or more of the
respective bidders on unequal terms. It is only then that the two-
part threshold requirement of Unocal is truly invoked....
In the face of disparate treatment, the trial court must first
examine whether the directors properly perceived that shareholder
interests were enhanced. In any event, the board's action must be
reasonable in relation to the advantage sought to be achieved, or
55. Id. at 1282 n.29.
56. Id. at 1287 (citations omitted).
57. Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 182.
58. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc., 559 A.2d at 1288.
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conversely, to the threat which a particular bid allegedly poses to
stockholder interests.59
Because the Macmillan case involved an undisputed "sale" of a
company, the court was not required to examine the issue of when
Revlon duties are triggered. Nevertheless, in an aside, the court
implied that the enhanced scrutiny of Unocal applied to all cases"where issues of corporate control are at stake."60  This brief remark
could be read to suggest a change in justification for enhanced scrutiny.
In Unocal the application of enhanced scrutiny to defensive actions was
justified by reference to the "omnipresent specter" of director self
interest.6' The application of enhanced scrutiny in Macmillan seemed
justifiable on a similar conflict-of-interest basis because one bidder was
favored over another in a takeover contest, thus raising the possibility
of foul play. But the court's broader language raised potential
conceptual problems for enhanced scrutiny, as suggested by Professor
Paul Regan:
In borrowing Unocal's "omnipresent specter" rationale for use in the
Revlon context, the Macmillan court did not explain why the
motives of a predominantly disinterested board should automatically
be regarded with suspicion. Certainly questions of improper motive
do not arise simply because directors have decided to sell the
company. ... Something more-like the "disparate treatment" of
competing bidders-would appear to be required before enhanced
scrutiny would be triggered in an auction.62
59. Id. Such legal reasoning is so often referred to as "tortured," that the designation has
become trite. In this case, however, even the fresh application of the word "tortured" would not
adequately reflect the court's treatment of Revlon because it implies that some remnant of Revlon
could survive such a beating. Surely the Court of Chancery should be forgiven for failing to
extract such an interpretation from reading Unocal and Revlon. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme
Court seemed very willing to cut the Court of Chancery some slack:
It is not altogether clear that, since our decision in Revlon, the Court of Chancery has
explicitly applied the enhanced Unocal standards in reviewing such board actions
[citations omitted]. On the surface, it may appear that the trial court has been applying
an ordinary business judgment rule analysis. However, on closer scrutiny, it seems that
there has been a de facto application of the enhanced business judgment rule under
Unocal. To the extent that this has caused confusion, we think it is more a matter of
semantics than of substance.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 1287.
61. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 954.
62. Paul L. Regan, The Unimportance of Being Earnest: Paramount Rewrites the Rules for
Enhanced Scrutiny in Corporate Takeovers, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 125, 169 (1994). For an
endorsement of the change-of-control trigger for Revlon, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 46.
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Although the Delaware Supreme Court subsequently held that the
Revlon standards applied to all change-of-control transactions,63 the
court appeared to hedge on this issue in the well-known case of
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. (Time).64 As discussed
below, Chancellor Allen declined to apply Revlon to the actions of
Time Inc.'s (Time) directors, reasoning that the merger between Time
and Warner Communications, Inc., was not a change of control. The
Delaware Supreme Court held that "his conclusion is correct as a
matter of law," but elected to base its decision on different grounds.6"
The court then famously attempted to define the circumstances in
which Revlon duties were to be applied:
Under Delaware law there are, generally speaking and without
excluding other possibilities, two circumstances which may implicate
Revlon duties. The first, and clearer one, is when a corporation
initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a
business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company.
However, Revlon duties may also be triggered where, in response to
a bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks
an alternative transaction involving the breakup of the company.66
This formulation-leaving open "other possibilities" than those
listed for the application of Revlon duties-created substantial
ambiguity. On the other hand, the court was abundantly clear in its
view that Revlon triggered duties that were distinct from Unocal
duties.67
The court fully embraced changes in corporate control as the
triggering event for Revlon duties in Paramount Communications v.
QVC Network Inc. (Paramount), stating:
The decisions of this court have clearly established the circumstanc-
es where . . . enhanced scrutiny will be applied. The case at bar
implicates two such circumstances: (1) the approval of a transaction
resulting in a sale of control, and (2) the adoption of defensive
measures in response to a threat to corporate control.6"
63. See, e.g., Barken v. Armsted Industries, 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) ("We believe
that the general principles announced in Revlon [and] in Unocal... govern this case and every
case in which a fundamental change of corporate control occurs or is contemplated.").
64. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
65. Id. at 1150.
66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. The court reasoned: "If, however, the board's reaction to a hostile tender offer is found
to constitute only a defensive response and not an abandonment of the corporation's continued
existence, Revlon duties are not triggered, though Unocal duties attach." Id. at 1150-51.
68. 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) (citations omitted).
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The rationale for applying enhanced scrutiny to all change-of-
control transactions lay not in the "omnipresent specter" of director
self interest,69 but rather in the significance of such transactions to
shareholders, which the court described as follows:
Because of the intended sale of control, the [acquisition of Para-
mount by Viacom] has economic consequences of considerable
significance to the Paramount stockholders. Once control has
shifted, the current Paramount stockholders will have no leverage in
the future to demand another control premium. As a result, the
Paramount stockholders are entitled to receive, and should receive,
a control premium and/or protective devices of significant value.7"
According to the court, change-of-control transactions are so
important that courts should review the reasonableness of director
action, even if the directors are disinterested.71 It is not clear what
the court thought it had to add by such an intrusion, given its view
that "[t]here are many business and financial considerations implicated
in investigating and selecting the best value reasonably available. The
board of directors is the corporate decisionmaking body best equipped
to make these judgments."72
Paramount is the Delaware Supreme Court's most recent effort to
reformulate Revlon,73 but in subsequent cases, the court has narrowed
its understanding of "change of control" to accord with Chancellor
Allen's opinion in Time.74
69. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 954.
70. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d at 43. The court went
on to say that, although the directors have the same duties of care and loyalty in a sale-of-control
context that they possess in other contexts, "[in pursuing [the sale], the directors must be
especially diligent." Id. at 44.
71. Id. at 45. Paul Regan called the court's decision "an unwarranted expansion of the role
of the courts in the context of corporate takeovers" and argued that "Paramount's transaction-
significance rationale represents a substantial departure from Delaware's traditional model of
corporate governance." Regan, supra note 62, at 190-91.
72. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d at 45.
73. Id. at 44.
74. For a discussion of Chancellor Allen's opinion in the Time case, see infra notes 112-14
and accompanying text. In Arnold v. Soc'yfor Sav. Bancorp., Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994),
the Delaware Supreme Court summarized the circumstances in which Revlon applies:
The directors of a corporation "have the obligation of acting reasonably to seek the
transaction offering the best value reasonably available to the stockholders," in at least
the following three scenarios: (1) "when a corporation initiates an active bidding process
seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a dear break-up of
the company"; (2) "where, in response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-
term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the break-up of the
company"; or (3) when approval of a transaction results in a "sale or change of control."
In the latter situation, there is no "sale or change in control" when " '[clontrol of both
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The court later held that a merger in which the shares would
remain "in a large, fluid, changeable and changing market" did not
require a Revlon analysis-even though the directors solicited
bids-because the directors had not sought to sell control of the
company.7" Currently, therefore, the court's view of enhanced
scrutiny in Revlon cases does not appear to be far removed from its
application of the traditional business judgment rule. In both
instances, the court will normally defer to the board of directors once
it is shown that the directors were well informed and acting in good
faith (the first prong of enhanced scrutiny). That deference in the
context of the business judgment rule will be overcome only when the
actions taken by directors cannot be "attributed to any rational
business purpose."" Under the Paramount holding, the deference is
overcome only if "the directors' decision was, on balance, [not] within
the range of reasonableness."" Whether these two standards are
substantively different will be examined in more detail below.
[companies] remain[s] in a large, fluid, changeable and changing market."'
Id. at 1289-90 (citations omitted).
75. In re Santa Fe Pacific Corporation Shareholder Litigation, 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995).
The Santa Fe case also contained an important statement about the relationship between enhanced
scrutiny and shareholder voting rights:
Permitting the vote of a majority of stockholders on a merger to remove from judicial
scrutiny unilateral Board action in a contest for corporate control would frustrate the
purposes underlying Revlon and Unocal. Board action which coerces stockholders to
accede to a transaction to which they otherwise would not agree is problematic. Thus,
enhanced judicial scrutiny of Board action is designed to assure that stockholders vote
or decide to tender in an atmosphere free from undue coercion.
Id. at 68 (citations omitted).
76. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). In Gagliardi v. TriFoods,
Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996), Chancellor Allen stated:
[I]n the absence of facts showing self-dealing or improper motive, a corporate officer or
director is not legally responsible to the corporation for losses that may be suffered as
a result of a decision that an officer made or that directors authorized in good faith.
There is a theoretical exception to this general statement that holds that some decisions
may be so "egregious" that liability for losses they cause may follow even in the absence
of proof of conflict of interest or improper motivation. The exception, however, has
resulted in no awards of money judgments against corporate officers or directors in this
jurisdiction and, to my knowledge only the dubious holding in this Court of Gimbel v.
Signal Companies, Inc., (Del. Ch.) 316 A.2d 599 affd (Del. Supr.) 316 A.2d 619 (1974),
seems to grant equitable relief in the absence of a claimed conflict or improper
motivation.
Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1051-52 (footnotes omitted).
77. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d at 45.
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Chancellor Allen's Revlon Jurisprudence
Throughout his tenure on the bench, Chancellor Allen struggled
to answer the two questions about the Revlon decision identified above:
(1) When are its special duties triggered?, and (2) What do those
duties specifically require?78  Viewed as a whole, the Delaware
judiciary has erected confusing and conflicting standards to divine the
answers to those questions.79 As a trial court judge, Chancellor Allen
was required to work within the constraints imposed by the Delaware
Supreme Court, but he managed to build a startlingly simple and
consistent approach to Revlon's strictures that has varied surprisingly
little over the course of his tenure on the court. His steadiness-a
marked contrast to the erratic and meandering jurisprudence of the
Delaware Supreme Court-can be traced to the fact that Chancellor
Allen viewed Revlon as a duty of loyalty case from the beginning, 0
whereas the Delaware Supreme Court is still uncertain, having recently
78. Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, CIV. A. No. 15513, 1997 WL 225708, at *12
(Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1997).
79. For a description of various fiduciary duty doctrines in the Delaware cases, see
Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and
Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593, 1609-14
(1994).
80. See, e.g., In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 8, 1988) ("if Revlon is explained as a duty of loyalty case (i.e., one in which the board
appeared not to be acting in good faith for the shareholders' benefit), which is how I read it.
.. ."); In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litigation, CIV. A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147, at
*14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) ("I understand [Revlon] as essentially a breach of loyalty case in
which the board was not seen as acting in the good faith pursuit of shareholders' interests.").
The only time Chancellor Allen introduced confusion on this issue was in his personal
liability opinion in Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., CIV. A. No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134 (Del.
Ch. Jun. 24, 1991). The plaintiffs in that case did not allege a duty of loyalty violation; they
argued instead that the directors were grossly negligent and that they violated their duty under
Revlon to maximize shareholder value. Chancellor Allen treated these two allegations as one,
stating:
[Wihere there is no breach of loyalty pleaded .... the due care theory and the Revlon
theory do not present separate legal theories justifying shareholder recovery. [citation
omitted] In such a context, both theories reduce to a claim that directors were
inadequately informed (of alternatives, or of the consequences of executing a merger and
related agreements). An auction is a way to get information. A pre- or post-agreement
market-check mechanism is another, less effective but perhaps less risky, way to get
information....
Id. at *16.
Of course, courts feel perfectly comfortable evaluating the information gathering process
under the business judgment rule, and this aspect of Revlon does not account for its uniqueness.
Rather, Revlon was intended to be different because it allowed the court to exercise a more
searching review of director action in situations where the "omnipresent specter" of self interest
is present. Under this view, Revlon is necessarily a duty of loyalty case.
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written, "Revlon and Unocal and the duties of a Board when faced with
a contest for corporate control do not admit of easy categorization as
duties of care or loyalty."8' As a duty of loyalty case, Revlon would
require application only when the board of directors has a found
conflict. The role of the courts is clear and confined to cases where
they might be expected to do some good.
Because of this reading of Revlon, Chancellor Allen's opinions are
based on a belief that Revlon does not fundamentally challenge the
traditional structure of corporate law, which holds that directors should
be allowed to make business decisions without judicial interference as
long as they are acting independently, in good faith, with adequate
information, and within the bounds of rationality. By comparison, the
Delaware Supreme Court seems intent on creating new and innovative
doctrines of corporate law without much regard for the animating
theories underlying the doctrines. As a result, the Revlon jurispru-
dence of the Delaware Supreme Court seems sporadic and difficult to
apply in future transactions.
The following sections organize Chancellor Allen's Revlon
decisions according to the three most important Delaware Supreme
Court cases discussed above: Revlon, Macmillan, and Paramount.
Chancellor Allen's ability to steer a straight course in such rough
waters is the defining characteristic of his substantial abilities as a
judge.
A. The Revlon Era
In the first cases following Revlon, Chancellor Allen cited Revlon
for the proposition that directors do not owe fiduciary duties to
creditors 2 or for a statement of the standard used to evaluate prelimi-
nary injunctions.8 3 Prior to the Delaware Supreme Court's oral
decision in Macmillan, Chancellor Allen decided only three cases in
which he wrestled with the core questions about Revlon.14 Before the
81. In re Santa Fe Pacific Corporation Shareholder Litigation, 669 A.2d at 67, citing
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d at 1345.
82. See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593 n.5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11,
1986); Kass v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 1986 WL 13008, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1986)
(memorandum opinion).
83. See, e.g., Citron v. Steego Corp., CIV. A. No. 10171, 1988 WL 94738, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 9,1988); In re Anderson, Clayton Shareholders Litigation, 519 A.2d 680, 686 (Del. Ch. Jun.
6, 1986).
84. See In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litigation, CIV. A. No. 9991, 1988 WL
83147 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988); In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A.2d
770 (Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 1988); Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Industries, Inc., 1987 WL 14323
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987) (memorandum opinion).
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written decision in Macmillan was issued, Chancellor Allen had
decided three additional important Revlon cases.85 Although these
decisions were rendered in the shadow the Delaware Supreme Court's
bench ruling in Macmillan, their analysis seems only marginally
affected by the ruling, and they are best grouped with the other cases
in the Revlon era.
Allen's first attempt to define the reach of Revlon came two years
after the Revlon decision. In Freedman v. Restaurant Associates
Industries, Inc. (Freedman), he stated: "The Revlon case recognizes an
obligation on the part of the board of directors, once it is clear to the
board that the corporation is to be subject to a change of control, to
attempt to maximize the amount to be received by shareholders." 6
Despite Allen's implication that Revlon applied to any change-of-
control transaction, he declined to apply Revlon in this case because an
independent special committee of the board "was appropriately
constituted, well advised and active," and "the results it achieved
bespeak an aggressive and effective attempt to maximize public
shareholder value."87  Although Chancellor Allen's reference to the
results achieved by the special committee might in retrospect be viewed
as a "de facto application of the enhanced business judgment rule under
Unocal,""8 the Freedman opinion later clarifies his reliance on the
stripped-down version of the business judgment rule. In deferring to
a special committee decision to refuse a request for a lock-up option,
Chancellor Allen wrote:
This court has no special expertise in making the judgment
concerning whether it would be wise or foolish to incur the risks
that further pursuit of [the] proposal inevitably entails; to the
contrary, one of the important reasons for the existence of the
business judgment rule is the institutional incompetence of courts to
pass upon the wisdom of business decisions. Plaintiffs have failed
utterly to offer any legal justification for the court's second-guessing
the decision of the special committee.8 9
The most important of Chancellor Allen's early Revlon decisions
is In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation (J.P. Stevens)
85. TW Services, Inc. v. Crown, CIV. A. No. 10427, 10298, 1989 VL 20290 (Del. Ch.
Mar 2, 1989); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, CIV. A. No. 10389, 1989 WL
7036 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989); City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d
787 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988).
86. Freedman, 1987 WL 14323, at *6.
87. Id. at *7.
88. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d at 1288 (emphasis added).
89. Freedman, 1987 WL 14323, at *8.
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which involved a battle between competing tender offerors.9" In
deciding whether the board of directors of the target corporation had
breached its fiduciary duties, Chancellor Allen considered two possible
interpretations of Revlon:
First, Revlon can be seen as a case essentially involving a board that,
if not disloyal to shareholder interests, was in a conflict situation.
This divided loyalty . . . justified the court, under conventional
doctrine, in reviewing the substantive fairness of the various board
actions there taken. Alternatively, Revlon may be viewed as a case
in which a finding of divided loyalty did not play a critical part. On
this view, the case establishes some rules about the kind of agree-
ments that may not be entered during an auction for corporate
control (e.g., those that will stop the bidding or that will favor one
bidder over another) even by a disinterested, fully functioning board
or, at the least, will call forth active judicial review of the wisdom
or fairness of such contracts."
As between these two views, Revlon itself is agnostic. Chancellor
Allen notes that Revlon "does not purport to restrict the powers of a
disinterested board from entering into agreements" that provide for
topping fees and expense reimbursements, as long as "the board acts
in good faith and with appropriate care."92 By the same token, one
might argue, Revlon does not require an actual conflict of interest
before the reviewing court is allowed to evaluate the reasonableness of
the board's actions. All that is required to justify that more searching
review is the "omnipresent specter" of self-interest, and surely an
agreement that creates an impediment to further bids raises the specter
of self-interest. In short, Revlon does not mandate either approach
proposed by the parties in the J.P. Stevens case. On what basis then,
did Chancellor Allen reject the more expansive view of Revlon in favor
of an approach employing the business judgment rule?
Unfortunately, Chancellor Allen does not explain the basis for his
decision beyond conclusory comments such as: "[I]f Revlon is viewed
as a duty of loyalty case . . . , which is how I read it,"93 and, in
response to one party's argument for an expansive reading, "I do not
90. 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 1988). Chancellor Allen begins the analysis portion
of this opinion with this observation about the case: "It seems hardly an exaggeration to say that
plaintiffs' argument... begins and ends with the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Revlon."
Id. at 778.
91. Id. at 779.
92. Id. at 781-82.
93. Id. at 781.
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so understand that case." 94  Reading between the lines, however, it
appears that Chancellor Allen was simply unwilling to interpose his
views where those of independent directors acting in good faith and on
reasonable investigation have already been heard.9" Stated another
way, Chancellor Allen seemed to approve of the traditional relationship
between courts and the judiciary, where judges interject themselves
only when the board of directors appears not to be properly motivated
to act in the best interests of the stockholders.
Chancellor Allen revisited Revlon in In re Fort Howard Corp.
Shareholders Litigation (Fort Howard), which involved an auction
following the announcement of a proposed management buyout.9 6
Chancellor Allen expanded on the views he had expressed in J.P.
Stevens, reiterating that he did not see the need for enhanced scrutiny
when the board of directors was disinterested, well-informed, and
acting in good faith.9 7 Indeed, when a board of directors exhibits
those characteristics, it might favor one bidder over another (as
happened in Fort Howard) without triggering enhanced scrutiny:
[A] board need not be passive even in an auction setting. It may
never appropriately favor one buyer over another for a selfish or
inappropriate reason, such as occurred in Revlon, but it may favor
one over another if in good faith and advisedly it believes share-
holder interests would be thereby advanced.... The need to
exercise judgment is inescapably put on the board at points in an
auction process and the validity of the exercise of that judgment is
appropriately subjected to a business judgment form of judicial
review.98
Chancellor Allen's repeated application of the business judgment
rule to Revlon claims suggests that he viewed Revlon as an extension
94. Id.
95. For example, Chancellor Allen refers critically to a hypothetical judge who is "inclined
to second guess board decisions." Id. at 779. He later states, "I do not regard myself as
authorized by Unocal or any other precedent of this court or the [Delaware] Supreme Court to
pass upon the reasonableness of the [board's] judgment," id. at 780, and argues that the issues
raised in the case are "precisely the sort of debatable questions that are beyond the expertise of
courts and which the business judgment rule generally protects from substantive review for
wisdom." Id. at 783. Finally, Chancellor Allen contends that even if an agreement skews the
"level playing field" of the auction, the court has no call to set aside the agreement, as long as it
was concluded by a board that was independent and acting in good faith on an informed basis.
Id. at 783-84.
96. In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litigation, CIV. A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147,
at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988).
97. In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A.2d 770, 779 (Del. Ch. Apr.
8, 1988).
98. In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 1988 WL 83147, at *14.
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of traditional doctrines of corporate law rather than as a revolutionary
new regime. Indeed, he stated as much in City Capital Associates Ltd.
Partnership v. Interco Inc., where he strove to place Revlon in the
context of traditional fiduciary duty law.9 9 He summarized the
teachings of J.P. Stevens, Fort Howard and Vice-Chancellor Jacobs'
decision in Macmillan as follows:
The contours of a board's duties in the face of a takeover attempt
are not, stated generally, different from the duties the board always
bears: to act in an informed manner and in the good faith pursuit
of corporate interests and only for that purpose. Unocal, of course,
adds that where the board acts to defeat such an offer, its steps must
be reasonable in light of the threat created by the offer. But I do
not think that Revlon intended to narrowly circumscribe the range
of reactions that a board may make in good faith to an attempt to
seize control of a corporation. Even when the corporation is clearly
"for sale," a disinterested board or committee maintains the right
and the obligation to exercise business judgment in pursuing the
stockholders' interest. 100
Chancellor Allen did not stop at that, but took pains to explain
that Revlon "can be seen as an application of traditional Delaware law"
and "should not ... be interpreted as representing a sharp turn in our
law. '10 As in previous cases, the lodestar for director action is "the
best interest of the shareholders, ' °  an auction is simply a
method of gathering information about the value of the company.
Chancellor Allen argued, however, that directors might fulfill their
duty to be informed without conducting an auction." 3
In spite of his efforts to blend Revlon into traditional corporate
norms, Chancellor Allen recognized distinct "Revlon duties." The
exact contours of those duties, however, remained unclear. The J.P.
Stevens and Fort Howard holdings both showed that Revlon duties did
not require a board to maintain a level playing field in an auction, but
to pursue the best interests of stockholders." 4 In Citron v. Fairchild
99. 551 A.2d 787, 801 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988).
100. Id. at 802. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation involved an auction in which
two bidders offered "substantially equivalent" bids. Chancellor Allen again rejected the notion
that Revlon imposed fiduciary duties independent of the duty of care and duty of loyalty. 1989
WL 7036, at *20 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
101. City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership, 551 A.2d at 802.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 802-03.
104. In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A.2d at 780; In re Fort
Howard Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 1988 WL 83147, at *14.
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Camera and Instrument Corp.,"' Chancellor Allen stated: "[P]laintiff
is certainly incorrect to assert that [Revlon] recognized a duty on the
part of directors when a corporation is 'for sale,' to get the highest
available price. Rather, the duty can only be to try in good faith, in
such a setting, to get the best available transaction for the shareholders.
Directors are not insurers."' 6  The phrase "best available transac-
tion" implies that factors other than price might be considered.' °7
Chancellor Allen backed away from this view in TW Services v.
SWT Acquisition Corp. (TW Services), when he observed that Revlon
makes the duty of directors "more targeted and specific" than usual,
requiring a board in a sales transaction to "exercise judgment (in good
faith and prudently) in an effort to maximize immediate share
value." ' Chancellor Allen's focus on price is a shift from the more
nebulous requirement that the board obtain the "best available
transaction" for shareholders. Although justifiable from a reading of
Revlon and other cases,0 9 the language is jarring in a Chancellor
Allen opinion because he had previously taken pains to emphasize that
price was not the only metric by which to measure board action.
TW Services gave Chancellor Allen his first opportunity to
evaluate the distinction between managing a company for the long term
and managing a company to maximize current stock prices. He asked:
May a board find itself thrust involuntarily into a Revlon mode in
which it is required to take only steps designed to maximize current
share value and in which it must desist from steps that would
impede that goal, even if that might otherwise appear sustainable as
an arguable step in the promotion of "long term" corporate or share
values?" °
Chancellor Allen answered that question by concluding that a
board is allowed to decline overtures for an acquisition, even if the
offered price exceeds the current value of the corporation's stock. The
board's decision is evaluated under the business judgment rule.
In the years following Revlon and preceding Macmillan, Chancel-
lor Allen saw a limited role for judicial intervention in change-of-
control transactions. He did not apply the enhanced scrutiny of Revlon
105. CIV. A No. 6085, 1988 WL 53322 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988).
106. Id. at *21 n.17.
107. In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A.2d at 781 n.6.
108. Civ. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2,1989).
109. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining, 535 A.2d 1334, 1344-45 (Del. 1987)
(citing Chancellor Allen's discussion of the Board's need to secure the highest price in conjunction
with its duties of loyalty and care).
110. TWServices, 1989 WL 20290, at *8.
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in the Freedman case. He did not apply it in J.P. Stevens. And, he
did not apply it in Fort Howard, Interco, RJR Nabisco, or TW Services.
In all of these cases, Chancellor Allen found evidence of self-interested
behavior on the part of the board of directors insufficient to trigger
judicial review of the reasonableness of board actions."' According
to Chancellor Allen, Revlon mandated reasonableness review only when
the board acted out of self interest, in bad faith, or without sufficient
information. In extremely limited circumstances, a court might engage
in substantive review if a board action "is so far beyond the bounds of
reasonable judgment that is seems essentially inexplicable on any
ground other than bad faith." '"12
B. The Macmillan Era
Shortly after the Delaware Supreme Court published its opinion
in Macmillan, Chancellor Allen addressed one of the most visible
merger cases in history, Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time
Inc." '3 Surprisingly, Chancellor Allen's view of Revlon appears to
have altered little, if at all, as a result of the Macmillan case as shown
by his decision in Time. As with all of his previous decisions in which
Revlon formed a prominent part, he declined to find that Revlon duties
had been triggered." 4 In this instance, he held that a stock-for-stock
exchange of two publicly traded companies did not result in a change
in control because "[c]ontrol of both remained in a large, fluid,
changeable and changing market."" 5 He also declined the plaintiffs'
invitation to extend Revlon beyond sales or other changes in control to
cover the situation where a present transaction might preclude a future
change in control (thus denying shareholders the ability to obtain a
control premium)." 6  In the process, he again noted his conviction
111. It is unclear what Chancellor Allen would have done if he had been presented with
such evidence. Presumably, evidence of self-interested behavior would result in a review of the
substantive fairness of the transaction, but Unocal and Revlon are intended to function as
intermediate standards (between the business judgment rule and fairness review), requiring only
"reasonableness." And this level of review is not triggered by found conflicts of interest, but
rather by the "omnipresent specter" of such conflicts.
112. In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A.2d at 780. This is simply
Chancellor Allen's restatement of the oft-quoted "rational business purpose" test from Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
113. 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. Jul. 14, 1989).
114. Id. at'23-*24.
115. Id. at *23.
116. Id. at *23-*25.
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
that "Revlon was not a radical departure from existing Delaware, or
other, law."1 17
Chancellor Allen's most informative discussion of the Revlon
decision during the Macmillan era is found in Roberts v. General
Instrument Corp. (Roberts).11 In that case, Chancellor Allen ex-
pressed his frustration with the Delaware Supreme Court's attempt in
the Macmillan case to clarify the relationship between Unocal and
Revlon:
In each instance where the board is not predominantly self-interest-
ed or under the control or dominating influence of a person with a
conflicting interest, the principal judicial inquiries relate to whether
the board was adequately informed and acting in good faith. This
court has been pointedly instructed, however, that "where issues of
corporate control are at stake" action of even a disinterested board
must meet an enhanced test before they will qualify for the
deference that courts ordinarily accord to good faith business
judgments." 9
Allen then restated the enhanced scrutiny standard for Revlon
cases as follows:
In such a setting the additional level of inquiry comes to this:
whether the circumstances afford a disinterested and well motivated
director a basis reasonably to conclude that if the transactions
contemplated by the merger agreement close, they will represent the
best available alternative for the corporation and its sharehold-
ers. 120
Roberts thus raises starkly the crucial question for purposes of
Revlon's viability as a separate fiduciary standard: Is substantive review
under Revlon materially different than substantive review under the
business judgment rule?12' The answer to this question is elusive
117. Id. at *25.
118. CIV. A No. 11639, 1990 WL 118356 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990).
119. Id. at *8.
120. Id. See also Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Indus., Inc., CIV. A. No. 9212, 1990
WL 135923, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 1990) ("The obligation of the directors where a transaction
is a non-conflict one, is to exercise due care in the good faith pursuit of legitimate goals. When
that transaction is the sale of the enterprise an additional level of inquiry-reasonableness-is
required.").
121. Alan Garfield raised a similar question with respect to the proportionality review of
Unocal:
After Unocal, the question for courts was whether this latter "proportionality" test
would be one of substance or of form. Would a defensive action pass the test, for
instance, if management simply alleged that there was a "threat" to the corporation, or
would courts actually determine whether the threat was credible? Would any defensive
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because the only case in which any Delaware court ultimately imposes
its own views under the Revlon reasonableness standard is Para-
mount. 122
During the Macmillan era, Chancellor Allen remained true to his
belief that Revlon imposed distinctive duties on directors. In Braun-
schweiger v. American Home Shield Corp., for example, Chancellor
Allen wrote:
While the Revlon case does not require that whenever a corporation
is to be sold for cash an auction be held, it does require, in my
opinion, at the least that directors take reasonable steps designed to
assure that they have probed for alternatives and have a reasonable
basis to conclude that the choice that they make is the best available
alternative. 123
C. The Paramount Era
Chancellor Allen discusses Revlon at some length in only three
cases after Paramount.124 In each, he begins with the difficult inquiry
into whether Revlon applies. As noted above, Paramount requires the
application of Revlon to all cases involving a change in control.
Perhaps the most interesting fact about Allen's treatment of these three
cases is his narrow view of the change-in-control requirement. In two
of the cases, Allen concluded that Revlon was inapplicable.121 In the
third, he assumed (without deciding) that Revlon applied so that he
could dispose of the case on the simpler issue of whether the directors
breached their Revlon duties. They did not.126
action be "reasonable" in relation to a threat, or would courts actually test for
proportionality?
Alan E. Garfield, Paramount: The Mixed Merits of Mush, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 37 (1991).
122. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49.
123. CIV. A No. 10755 1989 WL 128571, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989).
124. Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, CIV. A. No. 15513, 1997 WL 225708 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 25, 1997); Wells Fargo & Co. v. First Interstate Bancorp., CIV. A. Nos. 14696, 4623,
1996 WL 32169 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1996); Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. Jun. 17,
1994).
125. In Wells Fargo & Co. v. First Interstate Bancorp, Chancellor Allen held that Revlon
did not apply because the stock-for-stock exchange contemplated in Wells Fargo would not result
in the removal of control from the public securities markets. 1996 WL 32169. at *4. In the
Mendel case cited above, Chancellor Allen concluded that Revlon was inapplicable when a board
of directors refused an acquisition offer at a price higher than the price previously offered by a
controlling stockholder group and accepted by the board. Because the controlling stockholders
were not buying control, Allen reasoned, Revlon did not apply. Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d at
304-07.
126. Equity-Linked Investors, L.P., 1997 WL 225708, at 014.
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Once it is concluded that Revlon applies, three important
differences between the "Revlon state" and other states of board action
come into play. First, in the Revlon state, the board of directors must
focus on maximizing the current value of shares held by common
stockholders. Normally, a board of directors is allowed to sacrifice
current value in pursuit of future value, and its actions are subject to
deference under the business judgment rule. In the words of Chancel-
lor Allen, "That is the gist of the Revlon state: to act reasonably to
maximize current, not some future, value. (In other states, it is
entirely up to the board to exercise judgment over what time-frame the
corporation's resources are to be developed and how ... )""'
Second, the other duty imposed by Revlon is the duty to "fully
consider alternative transactions offered by any responsible buyer."'28
In other contexts, a board is empowered to "just say no" to proffered
transactions. In Macmillan, the Delaware Supreme Court wrote:
A refusal to entertain offers may comport with a valid exercise of
business judgment. Circumstances may dictate that an offer be
rebuffed, given the nature and timing of the offer; its legality,
feasibility and effect on the corporation and the stockholders; the
alternatives available and their effect on the various constituencies,
particularly the stockholders; the company's long-term strategic
plans; and any special factors bearing on stockholder and public
interests.'29
Third, the standard of review of Revlon claims is more searching
than for claims calling for application of the business judgment rule.
Chancellor Allen's final Revlon decision-Equity-Linked Investors, L.P.
v. Adams (Adams)-provides important insights on his understanding
of the obligations imposed on courts by Revlon. He begins his analysis
of Adams with a short history of the judicial treatment of Revlon by the
Delaware courts, identifying two general views of Revlon: (1) the"regulatory" view exemplified by Macmillan cast the court in an
127. Id. at *14. See also Wells Fargo & Co., 1996 WL 32169, at *4 n.3.
128. Wells Fargo & Co., 1996 WL 32169, at *4 n.3. See also Equity-Linked Investors, L.P.,
1997 WL 225708, at *13.
129. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35. See also
Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,1151-52 (Del. 1989); Pogostinv. Rice,
480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984). The "just say no" defense to unwanted takeover offers has been
approved in subsequent Delaware cases. See, e.g., Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907
F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995) (refusal of a board to redeem a poison pill in the face of an above-
market, all-cash offer for all shares was allowed); Paramount Communications v. QVC Network,
Inc., 637 A.2d at 34, 43 n.13 ("where a potential sale of control by a corporation is not the
consequence of a board's action, this Court has recognized the prerogative of a board of directors
to resist a third party's unsolicited acquisition proposal or offer").
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aggressive posture, reviewing board actions for fairness whenever the
corporation was "for sale" and "limit[ing] the range of good faith
business judgment that the board might make"; 3 ° and (2) the"normalizing" view exemplified by Chancellor Allen's early opinions
cast the court in a deferential ("business-judgment like") posture with
respect to decisions of an independent board of directors, even in the
context of a "sale."'' According to Chancellor Allen, the Delaware
Supreme Court's opinion in Paramount Communications v. QVC
Network 32 requires an "intermediate level of judicial review which
recognizes the broad power of the board to make decisions in the
process of negotiating and recommending a 'sale of control' transaction,
so long as the board is informed, motivated by [a] good faith desire to
achieve the best available transaction, and proceeds 'reasonably." 1 33
Other than the last aspect of the test-relating to the reasonable-
ness of the board's actions-this formulation of the standard of review
is exactly the same as the business judgment review that Chancellor
Allen applied in the early Revlon cases. The reasonableness review is
the "enhanced" aspect of this standard, but even this may not differ
much in practice from Chancellor Allen's business judgment review.
In J.P. Stevens, he stated that the reviewing court must determine
whether the board's action "is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable
judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other
than bad faith.' '1 34
Comparing the J.P. Stevens case with the Adams case is instruc-
tive. In both cases, Chancellor Allen found that the directors were
well informed and had acted in good faith, and that the ultimate
resolution of the case rested on whether the directors had acted
reasonably. In J.P. Stevens, the substantive inquiry into reasonableness
was part of the business judgment review. 3 ' Chancellor Allen's
inquiry was designed to determine whether the board's actions were"so beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment in the circumstances as
to give rise to an inference of bad faith."'36 In pursuing this inquiry,
Chancellor Allen confronted a claim that the directors of the target
130. Equity-Linked Investors, L.P., 1997 VL 225708, at *12-*13.
131. Id. at *13. Chancellor Allen summarized the effect of this position as follows: "In this
view 'Revlon duties' changed things only by shifting burden of proof and persuasion and by
focusing attention on present shareholder value, but it did not fundamentally interfere with the
freedom of directors to make good faith business judgment." Id.
132. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
133. Equity-Linked Investors, L.P., 1997 WL 225708, at 013.
134. In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A.2d at 780.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 781.
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corporation had breached their fiduciary duties by favoring one tender
offeror over another by granting a topping fee. 7  Whether the
topping fee was essential to obtaining a higher bid was a matter over
which "reasonable directors, exercising honest, informed judgment,
might differ .... Certainly, the decision to accede to the topping fee
in these circumstances does not fall afield of the expected range of
responses to warrant an inference that the Special Committee must
have been motivated by concern other than maximizing the value of
shareholders' interests."13' In other words, the actions of the board
were reasonable.
In Adams, Chancellor Allen also analyzed the reasonableness of
the board's action, asking, "has the board failed reasonably to
maximize the current value of the firm's equity?"' 3 9  Unlike J.P.
Stevens, here the substantive inquiry into reasonableness was not part
of the business judgment review, but rather part of the intermediate
level of judicial review prescribed by Paramount. In answer to his
question, Chancellor Allen again found himself faced with a situation
in which reasonable directors might differ:
[U]nlike two competing cash transactions or transactions in which
widely traded securities are offered, the alternatives that plaintiff
poses are rich with legitimate, indeed unavoidable, occasions for the
exercise of good faith business judgment. Where judgment is
inescapably required, all that the law may sensibly ask of corporate
directors is that they exercise independent, good faith and attentive
judgment, both with respect to the quantum of information necessary
or appropriate in the circumstances and with respect to the
substantive decision to be made. 4'
These cases starkly illustrate the parallel between the substantive
inquiry into reasonableness under the business judgment rule and
under the intermediate level of review. They are, in fact, identical.
Somehow, Chancellor Allen had managed to navigate a course that
brought Revlon back to its proper place.
Chancellor Allen's Reputation
This Article began by inquiring after the source of Chancellor
Allen's formidable judicial reputation. The foregoing examination of
his Revlon jurisprudence, especially when compared to cases decided
137. Id. at 772.
138. Id. at 783.
139. Equity-Linked Investors, L.P., 1997 WL 225708, at *14.
140. Id. at *17 (emphasis added).
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by the Delaware Supreme Court, sheds some light on the answer:
Chancellor Allen was a great judge partially because he recognized that
his role in addressing the fundamental question-"What is the
appropriate role of the modem corporation in a free society?"-was a
limited one.
Judges are rarely praised for their restraint. t4' With respect to
the fundamental question, however, corporate law has struck a
compromise with American society,142 requiring corporations to be
operated in the best interests of the shareholders, but in the ordinary
run of business, not enforcing that duty so strongly that a corporation's
board of directors cannot consider the interests of other constituen-
cies. 143  The Delaware Supreme Court attempted to upset that
compromise in takeover cases, but ultimately, the proper role of a
corporation in society should not be determined by the Delaware
courts. 
14 4
Marcel Kahan analyzed the takeover cases of the Delaware
Supreme Court and came to a surprisingly (given the foregoing
analysis) similar conclusion about its Revlon jurisprudence:
[Tlhe kinds of transactions that trigger heightened scrutiny under
Revlon and Unocal follow from the court's view of the proper
allocation of power between directors, shareholders, and courts in
deciding whether or not to accept a takeover bid. As Delaware
courts have repeatedly stated, it is the board of directors that
141. Sachs, supra note 6, at 783 (observing that activist judges are more renowned than
judges who exercise restraint).
142. Chancellor Allen addressed this point in a lecture on the fundamental question:
The questions "What is a corporation?" and "For whose benefit do directors hold
power?" are legal questions only in the sense that legal institutions will be required at
certain points to formulate or assume answers to them. But they are not simply
technical questions of law capable of resolution through analytical rule manipulation.
Even less are they technical questions of finance or economics. Rather in defining what
we suppose a public corporation to be, we implicitly express our view of the nature and
purpose of our social life. Since we do disagree on that, our law of corporate entities is
bound itself to be contentious and controversial. It will be worked out, not deduced.
In this process, efficiency concerns, ideology, and interest group politics will commingle
with history (including our semiautonomous corporation law) to produce an answer that
will hold for here and now, only to be torn by some future stress and to be reformulated
once more. And so on, and so on, evermore.
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
261, 280-81 (1992).
143. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming
1997).
144. This is the main point argued by William Cary in his oft-cited attack on the Delaware
courts. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
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manages the company-a power which includes, with some
qualifications, the power to decide whether or not to accept a
takeover bid. Shareholders legitimately express their views of how
a company should be run by electing directors whose views they
share. If shareholders are dissatisfied with a board's decision to
reject a takeover bid, their proper response is to elect a different
board. Courts should be reluctant to interfere in this interplay of
powers, but may have to do so when it fails to function proper-
ly.145
Although I believe, as a normative matter, that the regime
described by Kahan is desirable, 146 1 do not believe that the Delaware
Supreme Court has erected such a structure. In his creative synthesis
of Delaware takeover decisions, Kahan attempted to undo much of the
criticism levied against the Delaware Supreme Court for its develop-
ment of the Unocal and Revlon standards by arguing that the court's
decisions were consistent and rational. 147  Unfortunately, Kahan's
favorable evaluation of the Delaware Supreme Court rests on a
questionable characterization of the relationship between Unocal and
Revlon. He suggests that the Unocal standard is highly deferential and
focuses on process, 4 ' whereas Revlon is demanding and substan-
tive.1 49  The effect is to place power in the hands of independent
directors in Unocal cases and in the hands of judges in Revlon cases.
The policy underlying this supposed allocation of power is as follows:
Under Unocal, the court does not engage in a substantive review of
the decision by independent directors to reject a tender offer because
this decision is ultimately reversible by the shareholders themselves.
If, however, shareholders are deprived of the ability to override the
judgment of the independent directors, a principal rationale for the
deferential review standard has evaporated. In such instances, the
145. Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: An Update, 985 PLI/Corp. 37, 39 (1997).
This is a summary of Kahan's position, which he developed at length in Marcel Kahan,
Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583
(1994).
146. See D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons
from Kmart, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037 (1996).
147. Kahan, Paramount or Paradox, supra note 145, at 585.
148. "Unocal subjects a decision to reject an offer to an enhanced review of the process by
which this decision is arrived at, but not to an independent review of the substantive merits of
the decision." Kahan, Paramount or Paradox, supra note 145, at 588.
149. "Once in Revlon-mode, procedural factors, such as the approval of independent board
members and adequate information, are no longer sufficient for the court to validate the decisions
by a target's board. Instead, the court forces the target to give shareholders the opportunity to
accept the hostile tender offer and mandates a high degree of impartiality between the board-
favored and the hostile transaction." Id.
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court's only choices are to give the directors the power to reject a
tender offer irreversibly, to engage itself in a substantive review of
the board decision, or to give shareholders immediate say in whether
to accept the tender offer (e.g., by forcing the board to redeem a
poison pill). [I]n such instances the court subjects the decisions of
the board to the more stringent Revlon review or, if a target board
takes certain affirmative defenses, the court will exercise substantive
review under the "reasonable relationship" prong of Unocal.150
One problem with Kahan's analysis is that his characterization of
Unocal as a process standard relies on subsequent interpretations of
Unocal, whereas his view of Revlon arises only from a reading of the
case. In fact, as noted above, Revlon was decided shortly after Unocal,
and both opinions were authored by the same justice, Justice Moore.
Moreover, subsequent cases have shown that Revlon's version of
enhanced scrutiny has enjoyed as little exertion as Unocal's. Whether
one views these two cases as embodying process standards or substan-
tive standards, it seems that they should be treated as having the same
roots.
Kahan also wrongly suggests that the Delaware Supreme Court
relied on the shareholder vote as a corrective for bad board actions in
Unocal. The fact that the court in subsequent decisions has not
actively overturned board actions under the proportionality prong of
Unocal is not persuasive evidence regarding the "original intent" of
Unocal. The language of that decision evinces a commitment to a
substantial role for the judiciary in the cases to which it applies. The
opinion analogizes Unocal cases to duty of loyalty cases, where the
court employs the unquestionably substantive "entire fairness" review.
The lack of conflict found in Unocal cases was thought to preclude
entire fairness review, but the "omnipresent specter" of self-interest
150. Id. at 592. In addition to the problems discussed below, there is some internal conflict
in Kahan's position. He relies on the power of shareholders to "reverse" a board decision in a
Unocal situation, but argues that shareholders cannot be expected to reverse in a Revlon situation.
He concedes that shareholders could vote against the merger agreement just as they can vote to
elect new directors, but he reasons, "This argument would be persuasive if the merger agreement
had not been protected by a 'draconian' termination fee and stock option which would have been
triggered had Paramount's shareholders not voted in favor of a merger. These measures severely
constrained the ability of Paramount's shareholders to 'reverse' the merger agreement, just as the
lock-up option Revlon granted to Forstmann severely constrained shareholders' ability to reverse
Revlon's decision to reject Pantry Pride's offer." Id. at 596-97. If the only problem with
shareholder self-help were the draconian measures found in many merger agreements, why did
the court not address such measures directly rather than asking whether the shareholders received
the best price? One suspects that the main concern animating the Delaware Supreme Court was
the recognition that shareholders rarely vote against the recommendations of their directors,
especially when support of the directors will result in a hefty premium.
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justified more searching review than was found under the business
judgment rule.
Revlon was explicitly based on Unocal and attempted to apply its
enhanced scrutiny to the sale of a company. At first blush, this
enhanced scrutiny has some appeal. After all, in the sale of a
corporation, courts might be able to easily compare the price agreed to
by the board of directors with another price offered and decide in a
rather formulaic manner whether the corporation received the best
price. Unfortunately, application of such a formula to real transactions
proved impossible. Valuation is not an exact science, and comparisons
between offers require substantial business expertise, not merely the
juxtaposition of two share prices. Therefore, even if the court
suspected that directors were acting in a self-interested manner in
Revlon cases, there would be the problem of requiring the court to
impose its own "business judgment" (an oxymoron in the case of most
judges).
In the end, Kahan's defense of the Delaware Supreme Court fails.
Revlon and its progeny in the Delaware Supreme Court are rash
attempts to assert the importance of the court at the expense of
principle, not rational attempts to develop common law rules based on
proven principles. Their opinions created a great deal of uncertainty
in boardrooms across the nation and were unworthy of the final arbiter
of corporate law in the United States. In fairness, the Delaware
Supreme Court has rebounded somewhat from the impulsiveness of the
1980s. Arnold v. Society for Save Bancorp, Inc.151 and In re Santa Fe
Shareholder Litigation"S2 follow Chancellor Allen's lead in narrowing
the trigger for Revlon. The court could make further progress by
following Chancellor Allen's decision in Adams, interpreting the
substantive review under Paramount to be equivalent to the substantive
review under the business judgment rule. Better yet, the Delaware
Supreme Court could simply dispose of Revlon, as Chancellor Allen
almost certainly would have done had he been given the chance.
Despite my praise for Chancellor Allen's Revlon jurisprudence, it
has received some brickbats. Lyman Johnson and David Millon call
Chancellor Allen's opinion in Time "somewhat discursive""5 3 and
contend that his view of the shareholder primacy norm is incoherent:
151. 650 A.2d 1270, 1289 (Del. 1994).
152. 669 A.2d 59, 67 (Del. 1995).
153. Lyman Johnson & David Miflon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAW. 2105, 2105
(1990).
[Vol. 21:577
Tribute to Chancellor Allen
Chancellor Allen in effect says that, in one set of cases (Revlon,
[City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v.]Interco, and [Grand Metro-
politan Public Ltd. Co. v.] Pillsbury) he prefers the norm of share-
holder primacy-whether in its substantive wealth maximization
dimension or its procedural choice dimension--over competing
values like labor security and minimal indebtedness, while in others
(such as Time) he does not. Nowhere, however, has either he or the
Supreme Court stated why, or identified a more elemental and
authoritative principle that differentiates those two categories.
Underlying normative preference remains, unarticulated and
unjustified." 4
This criticism is misplaced. Not only do Johnson and Millon
attribute to Chancellor Allen approval of Revlon and Pillsbury-cases
that he did not decide but was forced to live with 1S5-but their focus
on the shareholder primacy norm confuses a commitment to sharehold-
er primacy with a commitment to judicial intervention. Chancellor
Allen was an unabashed proponent of shareholder primacy, but he also
believed that courts should defer to the shareholders' chosen represen-
tatives, the directors, absent some reason to suspect unfairness.
Ultimately, Johnson and Millon's criticism of Chancellor Allen fails
because they use a constricted view of shareholder primacy, focusing
exclusively on the shareholder primacy norm (an aspect of a director's
fiduciary duty) rather than on the structural protections under
corporate law (such as shareholder voting) that ensure shareholder
primacy.
Chancellor Allen's work will easily outlast his critics. Operating
under the direction of a higher court with a penchant for creating"new" fiduciary duties, Chancellor Allen consistently expressed his
belief in the proven structure of corporate law. In J.P. Stevens, one of
his earliest Revlon decisions, he characterized Revlon as fitting
comfortably within "conventional doctrine."156 Despite several
important Delaware Supreme Court decisions in subsequent years,
Chancellor Allen similarly downplayed the importance of Revlon in
Wells Fargo, one of his last opinions on the subject:
154. Id. at 2117-18.
155. Revlon, of course, was decided by the Supreme Court and was thus binding on
Chancellor Allen. The Pillsbury case was decided by retired Delaware Supreme Court Justice
Duffy, sitting by designation on the Court of Chancery. The judges of the Court of Chancery
strive to remain consistent within the Court. Chancellor Allen, therefore, was bound to reconcile
Pillsbury with his own cases. See Grand Metropolitan Public Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d
1049 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1988).
156. In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A.2d at 779.
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Historically, one would say that courts would be slow to impose [a
limitation on the board's ability to pursue future value at the
expense of current value] except in limited circumstances. . . And
indeed despite the fact that commentators tended to treat the Revlon
case as revolutionary, recent cases have made clear that it did not
deviate from this tradition very greatly.1 7
Chancellor Allen's consistency is remarkable given the extreme
changes in Delaware Supreme Court opinions described above. It is
all the more remarkable because the essence of his position was
forbearance. Not only did he have tremendous power by virtue of his
position, but he had been given license to use that power expansively
by a higher court. Many judges would yield to that temptation, 15 8
but Chancellor Allen did not.
CONCLUSION
Several years ago, Chancellor Allen gave a speech at Cardozo
School of Law in which he addressed the fundamental question.'59
Although he claimed not to be a scholar and felt "rather more like a
frog that consents to jump onto the biologist's table," 60 his intro-
spection seemed to indicate that he was simultaneously acting as both
frog and biologist. In sharing his thoughts, he revealed much about
his view of judging and implied that he might agree with the thesis of
this Article. He began with a statement that he claimed "will seem
trite to scholars, [and] is offered principally to the students":
Corporation law and, indeed, the law generally, is not simply what
it may seem at first, a comprehensive system of legal rules. While
it is that, it is also a great deal more. People who think of law as a
system of legal rules alone fail to understand that law is a social
product, inevitably complex, at points inescapably ambiguous, and
always dynamic-always becoming something new ... In order to
grasp the dynamic feature of legal rules, it is necessary to see them
157. 1996 WL 32169, at *4 n.3. Although no citations were provided, the "recent cases"
to which Chancellor Allen refers surely include Paramount, which he later said had "narrowed the
range of corporate transactions to which the principle of Revlon applies." Equity-Linked Investors,
L.P., 1997 WL 225708, at '13.
158. Joseph Smith, the founder of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
described this phenomenon exactly: "We have learned by sad experience that it is the nature and
disposition of almost all men, as soon as they get a little authority, as they suppose, they will
immediately begin to exercise unrighteous dominion." THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANT OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 121:39 (1839).
159. Allen, supra note 142.
160. Id. at 261.
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in their historical and social context. For while, in one sense, legal
rules exist "out there," constituting shared interpretations of our
common legal culture, they are, as well, continually recreated within
that culture through interpretation. We cannot begin to understand
the processes of law, unless we try to place law in its rich historical
and social context.161
I have argued that it was Chancellor Allen's willingness as a judge
to place legal rules in their broader historical and social context that
earned him the right to be called a great judge. He recognized that
new developments in business practice do not always mandate new
legal rules. The fundamental structure of corporate law has served us
well,162 and those who would too easily cast it aside are a threat. In
years to come, I believe Chancellor Allen will be remembered-with
some hyperbole, but nevertheless with a grain of truth-as the judge
who saved corporate law.
161. Id. at 262.
162. See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW
(1993).
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